Essay -How Copyright Got a Bad Name For Itself
Jane C. Ginsburg * Over the last several years, copyrighted works have come to account for a healthy portion of our GNP, and an even more substantial share of U.S. exports. 1 Nonetheless, copyright i s in bad odor these days. Many of the developments over the last years designed to protect copyright have drawn academic scorn, and intolerance even from the popular press. 2 I have a theory about how copyright got a bad name for itself, and I can summarize it in one word: Greed.
Corporate greed and consumer greed. Copyright owners, generally perceived to be large, impersonal and unlovable corporations 3 (the human creators and interpreters --authors and performers -albeit often initial copyright owners, tend to vanish from polemical view), have eyed enhanced prospects for global earnings in an increasingly international copyright market. Accordingly, they have urged and obtained ever more protective legislation, that extends the term of copyright 4 and interferes with the development and dissemination of consumer-friendly copying technologies. 5 Greed, of course, runs both ways. Consumers, for their part, have exhibited an increasing rapacity in acquiring and "sharing" unauthorized copies of music, and more recently, motion pictures. 6 Copyright owners' attempts to tame technology notwithstanding, such developments as compression formats, high speed lines, and peer to peer networks, particularly popular on college campuses, recast Annie Oakley's anthem from "Anything you can do, I can do better,"
7 to "Anything you can steal, I can steal more of." At least some of the general public senses as illegitimate any law, or more particularly, any enforcement that gets in the way of what people can do with their own equipment in their own homes (or dorm rooms). Worse, they would decry this enforcement as a threat to the Constitutional goal of promotion of the Progress of Science, and thus a threat to the public interest.
In this formulation, the "public interest" is doing a lot of work, not all of it persuasive. The "public interest" does not mean the personal interest of 3 See, e.g., Steven Levy, The Great Liberator, WIRED Oct. 2002 p. 140 (denouncing the "copyright machine"). Representative F. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis), Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and an active force in setting the agenda of the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, has been especially critical of U.S. music industry groups, calling them "copyright cartels" and arguing that consumer access to online content should be "expanded, not restricted. 4 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) . 5 See "anticircumvention" provisions of Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) . 6 See, e.g., Greg Wright, Online Music Sites: Some Pay, Others Play, TIMES UNION (Albany), Mar. 14, 2002, at P21, available at LEXIS Gannett News Service, Newsfile (discussing appeal of free music on the internet); Dawn C. Chmielewski members of the public in getting works of authorship without paying for them. This is as much a perversion of the Constitutional copyright clause as is the anthropomorphically nonsensical, but infinitely self-serving, adage "Information wants to be free." 8 But neither is every legal protective measure that a copyright owner urges in the name of authors' Constitutional interest in "securing . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings" 9 a guarantor of the Progress of Science. In fact, the "public interest" in a balanced copyright system that provides meaningful incentives to first authors, while allowing second authors room to build on their predecessors' endeavors, as well as reasonable leeway for autonomous consumer enjoyment, has come in for considerable battering by both copyright owners and users.
Rhetoric has supplied a heavy cudgel in the battering. Copyright owners and users have both appropriated words' desirable associations, while endeavoring to endow them with improbable, indeed, contrary, meanings. Consider "sharing." Before Napster, sharing meant giving something up so that others could enjoy the object with which the sharer parted. That is why "sharing" is something children do not like to do. That is also why "sharing" was laudable; it implied the selfless improvement of the lot of others. But Napster brought us a new kind of "sharing," one in which recipients could enjoy the giver's munificence, while the giver never had to give anything up. This kind of "sharing" did not require transfer of the giver's copy of the copyrighted work; the giver simply made it possible for the recipients to make more copies. Eve ryone benefitted; everyone, that is, except the creators and owners of the copied works. Or, as the much-maligned Lars Ulrich of "Metallica" quipped, "Sharing's only fun when it's not your stuff." 10 Admittedly, Napster's appropriation of the "sharing" l anguage was not entirely cynical, as the software protocol on which Napster was built was already known as "peer-to-peer file sharing." But that term stems from the practices of research scientists who shared information and results of their own devising; they did not acquire and distribute the fruits of others' labors without the laborers' express or implied authorization. , at 32 (noting that although the term "P2P" currently embodies a wide variety of networking options which bypass a central server, file sharing began with the internet, "itself … a peer-to-peer system in which university the term's genesis, "file sharing" à la Napster was simply unpaid copying for personal enjoyment. So understood, the activity lacks moral luster. But call it "sharing," and it glows with the beneficent associations of the word in its original altruistic guise. Accordingly, copyright owners' attempts to stop it seem churlish and Scrooge-like.
Users and their commercial facilitators, however, are not the only parties fairly charged with linguistic humbug. Copyright-owner industries, too, should bear their share of shame for verbal abuse. In particular, overdepiction of "piracy" as the unauthorized copying by end-users not only distorts but trivializes the term.
12 Even after the means of copying became available to the mass market, "piracy" still meant large-scale copying and sale to the public by for-profit actors. For example, individuals engaged in home taping for private use were not "record pirates;" that term designated commercial intermediaries. 13 Indeed, Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1992 to make clear that an infringement claim could not be brought "based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of [a digital or analog recording] device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings." 14 Similarly, in the "Betamax" case, the Supreme Court ruled that a more modest kind of private copying -timeshifting of free broadcast television programs -constituted fair use.
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This analysis does not mean to suggest that all private copying is infringement-immune. In fact, the cumulative economic impact of private copies, particularly if the copying becomes widespread and systematic, may be quite deleterious, and should be prevented. Nonetheless, to call private copying that falls outside the scope of fair use or the statutory exemption in the Audio Home Recording Act "piracy" is to wield a verbal bludgeon that ultimately discredits the condemnation. Equation of carefree home taping Peter Pans with professional bootlegging Captains and government mainframes swapped information as equals"). 12 For a more extensive critique of copyright owners' rhetorically excessive use of "piracy," see, e.g., Jessica Litman, Hook is more likely to instill resentment and hostility on the part of those who see themselves in the former role than to inspire their respect for authors' rights. Worse yet, it may make the real pirate's acts seem less blameworthy.
This Essay does not attempt a comprehensive review of recent U.S. copyright legislation and caselaw. Instead, it offers an analytical framework that will allow me to be both informative and opinionated. I propose first to expose some examples of the kind of copyright owner overreaching that has correctly given copyright a bad name. I then will argue that not all the bad publicity is deserved. Rather, much of the last years' legislation and caselaw, instead of overreaching, appropriately reaches out to address new problems prompted by new technologies, so as to strike a happier balance between copyright owner, intermediary, and end-user interests (or greeds). This in turn will permit our legal system to continue to afford a hospitable environment for the creation and dissemination of works of authorship, to the ultimate enrichment of the public.
I. What Copyright did to get a bad name for itself
High up on the list is the 1998 Sonny Bono Term Extension Act, 16 which added 20 years to the term of current and future copyrights. As a result, copyright now endures for a term of 95 years from publication, or 70 years following the death of the author. Thus, for example, a work first pub lished in 1923, whose copyright would have expired in 1998, will now be protected until the end of 2018. This prompts the question whether a copyright is forever. Nowadays it just keeps going and going and going . . . A challenge to the term extension was argued to the U.S. Supreme Court in October 2002. 17 In lieu of legal argumentation regarding that case, I advance a moral point: the more superannuated a work becomes, the more its protection seems a drag on the system and on new authors, particularly when the benefits to old authors are nonexistent or exceptionally attenuated. As a result, the moral claims of copyright, as a system designed to promote and compensate creativity, lose plausibility. I strongly doubt the extra 20 years do much for authors (past or future), especially since the term extension law did not provide for their vesting in the authors' heirs.
18 But the additional 20 years do, I believe, put pressure on the system to offset the gain in years with a diminution in the scope of protection, for example, through a more vigorously implemented fair use exception, not only during the last 20 years, but perhaps throughout the copyright term.
19
Let us turn now to the topic of copyright and technology, a love-hate relationship I might subtitle, with apologies to Tom Lehrer, as doing the "masochism tango."
20 Last year, in a prominent forum for the discussion of international copyright issues, some participants suggested that the players in the debate over technological means of committing or forestalling copying were all paranoid, each suspecting the other of bottomless malevolence in their respective endeavors to control or to liberate copyrighted material.
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The self-destructive dance between copyright owners and technology entrepreneurs is h ardly new, as developments from piano rolls to videotape recorders attest. 22 Nor is today's invective significantly more strident, as even a glance at the legislative history of the 1909 Act mechanical license, 23 can learn new tricks, but neither do many copyright owners, particularly the larger ones, appear to be leaping to unleash these technologies' potential. In this debate, appearance counts a lot; and, whatever their conduct in fact, many copyright owners appear -or are portrayed by some vigorous detractors in the academy and in the popular press -as hell-bent on stomping out both new technology and the scientists and entrepreneurs behind it.
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Recent caselaw offers many other examples of perceived copyright owner overreaching; I will limit myself to two: Re verse Engineering and Parody. The first adds to the technology controversies the distasteful sauce of anti-competitive conduct. What, after all, has the reverse engineer done? He has made an intermediate copy of the targeted work's otherwise unavailable source code, in order to learn how to make an independent but compatible or competing product. As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, most other copyrighted works by their nature disclose the information necessary to create a new work that complements or even competes with it. 28 Because most computer programs are disseminated only in object code, however, that information remains hidden; its extraction requires copying, even if the product that results from that extraction does not. Using copyright to suppress information does not cast copyright owners in an attractive light.
By the same token, infringement claims against parodies make copyright owners look not only power-hungry, but exceedingly humorless. The claim against The Wind Done Gone, Alice Randall's counter-story to Gone with the Wind, 29 was particularly ill-advised. Not only was it a public relations disaster, but its resolution, finding fair use, may open the door to assertions that "cultural icons" are free game for alternative retellings. 30 The Lord of the Rings per Gollum, or Harry Potter recounted from the point of view of Voldemort, anyone?
Given this litany of lamentable actions by copyright owners, it helps to 27 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2, and infra note 33. 28 recall that in most of these cases, the courts held that no infringement had o ccurred because the fair use privilege sheltered defendants' activities. 31 Thus, fears that copyright had become the land of the "incredible shrinking" fair use doctrine have proved premature if not unfounded.
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In other words, The System still Works. With that observation, I turn to the second theme of this Essay: that over the last several years, copyright law has often appropriately reached out to address new problems, many of them prompted by new technologies, in a way that sensitively endeavors to balance multiple interests.
II.
More Reaching Out than Overreaching
Let's start with the dreaded Digital Millennium Copyright Act. While sec. 1201's prohibition on circumventing technological protection measures has drawn much criticism, 33 three of the DMCA's four statutory innovations have received far less attention in the annals of opprobrium. This is because they either respond to requests from constituencies other than copyright owners, or because they more successfully balance the interests of copyright owners, users, and intermediaries. 31 See also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F. (1998) (describing fair use in the context of educational copying as "an incredible shrinking affirmative defense," swiftly being "compacted into ineffectuality by profit minded copyright owners, whose 'neutral' desire to maximize revenues fosters intense opposition to the doctrine of fair use"). 33 
First, § 512 -Online service provider liability:
The substantial immunity for mere conduit access providers, 34 and the notice-and-takedown system for host service providers, 35 largely favor telecom intermediaries. If the service providers follow the statutory safe harbor rules, they will not be liable for damages. The system set in place arguably disfavors unauthorized postings, as service providers' incentives are to take down rather than defend the public availability of the material. But recognizing that the threat that notice-and-take-down could be abused and thus degenerate into a means to secure private injunctions, the statute also requires copyright owners who receive a counter-notice from the offending subscriber to institute suit, or see the material reposted. 36 In this respect, I suggest that the U.S. provisions are more balanced than their EU analogue, as the E -Commerce Directive provides for notice and take down, but no put back. 37 Second, another relatively uncontroversial DMCA feature is its extension to webcasting of the compulsory license provisions of the 1995 Digital Performance Right in sound recordings. 38 That said, however, setting the compulsory license rates has proved somewhat daunting. The rates that the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel initially proposed 39 have been rejected by the Copyright Office, 40 following an outcry from smaller webcasters hard put to pay the fees. 41 The Copyright Office's response indicates its sensitivity to the concern that the wonderful diversity of niche audiostreaming that the web can foster should not be 34 17 U.S.C. § § 512(a), (j). 35 Id. at § § 512(c), (g), (j). 36 Id. at § 512(g). 37 financially compelled to yield to the homogenizing transmissions of the better-fed entities. At the same time, the sound recording producers and performers whose works are webcast should be compensated for this kind of public performance. This is particularly true for smaller labels and for performers who self-record: smaller webcasters may well be more likely to communicate their works than are mainstream webcasts made simultaneously with radio broadcasts. As public performance rights may become an increasingly important source of revenue, particularly relative to record sales, 42 an appropriate scale of webcasting royalty rates is crucial both to those who create and to those who communicate the recorded performances. It remains to be seen whether the revised rate the Copyright Office has now set 43 will reconcile both objectives. (1998) (suggesting that the "technological ability to restrict access to information, and information asymmetries, provide information suppliers with an inherent advantage over users," and is worth emphasizing that sec. 1202 governs information ident ifying the work's provenance and the conditions of sale or license; it covers neither access and copying controls, nor personal information regarding users.
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Accurate licensing information should substantially reduce tracing and transaction costs. Section 1202's prohibition against knowing removal or tampering with copyright management information should, accordingly, make that information more reliable; 48 reliability in turn promotes intermediary and end user interests, as well as copyright owner interests, by facilitating e-commerce and by helping to ensure the authenticity of digitally distributed works. I persist in hoping that sec. 1202 will also afford an indirect means to advance authors' rights of attribution and integrity. After all, the author's name is one element of Copyright Management Information, and arguably, altering the work so that it no longer corresponds to its description in the copyright management information is a kind of tampering with the information. 49 Fourth, §1201 -Technological protection measures: the DMCA prohibits the act of circumventing technological measures that control access to copyrighted works.
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It also bars "trafficking" in devices primarily designed to achieve that objective. 51 Many excruciatingly that furthermore, "information suppliers set consumers' agenda by releasing particular informational works and withholding others"). 46 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2041 (2001) (cautioning that digital controls are the result of a market-driven quest for information, unconstrained by physical division of public and private spheres, and therefore "if the state wants this information, or if a third party wants to use state process to compel its production, it is harder to argue against that result if the information, presumptively relevant, is already there"); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 185 (1997) (arguing that "technologies that monitor reading, listening, and viewing habits represent a giant leap-whether forward or backward the reader may decide-toward monitoring human thought"). 47 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(8) (in prescribing elements of copyright management information, Register of Copyrights "may not require the provision of any information concerning the user of a copyrighted work"). 48 detailed and endlessly lobbied exceptions to the prohibition on circumvention follow, but their very specificity precludes resort to more open-ended, flexible exceptions such as fair use. 52 Moreover, courts have concluded that Congress intended that preclusion.
Congress was persuaded that the relative security of a closed list of exceptions would encourage copyright owners to make works available over digital networks. Were the law to allow leeway for hacking, copyright owners then would lack incentive to offer more varied and less expensive forms of access to and enjoyment of copyrighted works. 53 For example, today, most popular music is made available as a package of songs on a hardcopy CD. (That is, when users haven't acquired it by other means such as Napster or its successors.) As a result, consumers often end up purchasing 10 or 12 songs, of which only one or two have any appeal. Moreover, though purchase of the CD permits unlimited listening, many purchasers may listen to their CDs only very rarely after the first hearings. One can see the attraction of marketing music as individual songs, on a pay-perlisten, or keep-it-for-a-week basis. And the cost would no longer be the $15 charged for the CD, but, say $1 for the week. But this system only works if keep-it-for-a-week doesn't turn into forever, through circumvention of the technological measure that makes the song disappear after a week.
On the other hand, not all circumvention may occur simply for chiseling or other nefarious purposes. And it is possible that, by ruling out fair use in favor of a list of specified exceptions, Congress may be foreclosing activities that seem legitimate even if unlisted. This Essay is not the occasion for detailed review and criticism of the provisions on access controls. 54 For present purposes, however, it suffices to suggest that the statute's built-in safety valve of triennial Copyright Office rulemakings on available non-infringing uses may counteract tendencies to digital lockup. 55 For the moment, despite much apprehe nsion, little concrete evidence of a diminution of fair use and other non infringing activities has been submitted. 56 Turning from legislation to litigation, I will not here discuss Napster, 57 as I addressed that decision and some of its implications in an earlier volume of this Journal. 58 Rather, I briefly consider Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 59 a more recent Ninth Circuit decision, which I believe strikes an encouraging balance between fostering the dissemination of information via the Internet on the one hand and securing the author's interest in the economic potential of digital distribution for her work on the other. Kelly, a photographer whose website displayed his works and offered copies via paid download, sued Arriba Soft, the deve loper of an Internet index of images. Arriba drew the index from a database that it had created by crawling and copying photographic images on the web. Arriba then converted the images to low-resolution "thumbnails" that it would make available in response to search requests. This index, as the first to search and retrieve by image rather than by word, offered a highly desirable innovation. But that is not all the index did. It also allowed the user to click on the thumbnail to see an enlarged, higher-resolution image. According to the Ninth Circuit, Arriba Soft did not copy the higher-quality image into its website, but rather framed its website around the image as it appeared on the originating photographer's site. 60 In applying to digital communications the exclusive right under § use has not been held to be constitutionally mandated, and that in any event, "Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of the original. 60 The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that no copying had occurred may be questionable, at least under the doctrine of "RAM copying" announced in the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI v. Peak, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) as the framed image creates a temporary copy in the memory of the user's computer. The court's perception that no prima facie actionable reproduction occurred through the framing, however, should be encouraging to those who fear that the doctrine of RAM copying will bring every act of digital use within the copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction. See, e.g., Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act's Neglected Solution to the Controversy over RAM "Copies," 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 84 (arguing that the doctrine of RAM copying "threatens to create significant problems as more and more works are used in digital form and has the potential to give copyright owners excessive control over the use of their works"); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights On the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 578 (1997) (hypothesizing an "absurd result" of a literal application of the RAM copying doctrine in which "copyright owners will literally shut down the Net by enforcing the rights the courts have declared they have"); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 4, 1996, at 134 (vigorously opposing the NII White Paper proposal creating an "exclusive right to read" based on the RAM copying doctrine).
106(5) to authorize the "public display" of visual works, 61 the Ninth Circuit held that Arriba had prima facie infringed Kelly's copyrights in the photographs Arriba framed as well as those that it copied into its index. The court then held that the copying and display of the thumbnail images was fair use, because the use was primarily informational and did not substitute for purchase or commercial exploitation of the images. Put another way, the public benefit of the new and non competing informational use outweighed the copyright owner's interest in controlling copying. By contrast, the display of enlarged higher-resolution images did not constitute fair use because it competed with the photographer's market for digital downloads of his works. The higher-quality photos may have enhanced, but they were not necessary to the information-communicating function of the index; by contrast, their availability via defendant's site allowed the public to bypass plaintiff's own presentation of his photographs. Although the court did not allude to the photographer's "moral rights" interest in preserving the artistic integrity of his work, 62 the Ninth Circuit's ruling may be seen as a determination that a third party framing technique that obliterates or obscures the visual and informational context in which the author set her work is not "fair." Seen in this light, the decision may signal sensitivity to the potential prejudice to authors of undisclosed digital remanipulation of their works.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft, I believe, appropriately balances the public interest in the vibrant development of the Internet as a tool for locating information on the one hand, with protecting authors' emerging digital markets (and perhaps her artistic integrity) on the other.
One may hope that the decision heralds a happy accommodation of owner/user interests in digital communications that should prove more complementary than antagonistic.
How happy the outcome will be in fact for owners and users, or their commercial intermediaries, will in the end depend on whether these actors can keep their greed in check. Both sides can wield greedgratifying technology to copy and distribute, or to lock up, works of authorship. But, despite some intemperate portrayals in academe and in the popular press, copyright law, both statutory and caselaw, has often intervened to temper owners' and users' more porcine inclinations. Decisions like Campbell v. Acuff-Rose and Suntrust ("The Wind Done Gone") warn copyright owners that they cannot privatize popular culture, at least not to the extent of keeping the work and the social context for which it has come to stand, free from trenchant, even raucous, criticism. Decisions like Kelly and Napster remind users and intermediaries that the technological ease of making and distributing copies does not of itself justify supplanting the author's online market opportunities. And the DMCA, whatever its many imperfections, endeavors to foster a digital environment in which enhanced security encourages the digital release of works, and limitations on service provider liability promote their broad circulation.
